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Abstract
In the pool of people seeking partners, a uniformly greater preference for abstinence
increases the prevalence of infection and worsens everyone’s welfare. In contrast, pre-
vention and treatment reduce prevalence and improve payoffs. The results are driven
by adverse selection—people who prefer more partners are likelier disease carriers. A
given decrease in the number of matches is a smaller proportional reduction for people
with many partners, thus increases the fraction of infected in the pool. The greater
disease risk further decreases partner-seeking and payoffs.
Keywords: Adverse selection, asymmetric information, epidemiology, infectious dis-
ease.
JEL classification: D82, D83, C72.
Abstinence education is a widespread policy aiming to combat sexually transmitted dis-
eases (STDs) and unwanted pregnancy. This paper contrasts the consequences of abstinence
with preventive measures (inoculation, condoms) and treatment in an economic epidemiol-
ogy model. Despite seeming similarity, abstinence has the opposite effect to vaccines and
cures on disease prevalence and the welfare of people with any preference intensity for an
increased number of partners.
The goal of abstinence programs is to change preferences towards reducing the number
of sex partners. If those with fewer partners reduce their number of matches more, then the
prevalence of the disease among the active partner-seekers increases. The reason is adverse
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selection: those most eager to match are the likeliest to be infected. The abstinence inter-
vention and preference-based behaviour modification are complementary to those considered
in the previous literature and imply different welfare consequences.
A change in prevalence among match-seekers analogous to that induced by partial ab-
stinence of the low-activity people occurs when the disease carriers choose to have more
partners. For example, treatment partly restores their health, thus the ability to search for
contacts, which was previously reduced by illness.
Given any preferences, a decrease in the fraction infected cannot increase prevalence in the
pool of match-seekers in the short run, even though the optimal number of partners chosen
increases in response. The direct effect of the decreased infections is never overwhelmed by
the indirect effect of a greater probability of matching, because if the new higher rate of
matches raises the weighted prevalence in the pool of partner-seekers to its original level,
then the best responses are the same as initially. At the initial numbers of matches, the
smaller infected fractions imply a reduced prevalence in the pool. By a similar revealed
preference reasoning, vaccines always increase payoffs in the short run: the same number of
partners as before the vaccine introduction is still a feasible choice, now with a lower chance
of infection. This contrasts with a change in preferences towards fewer partners, for example
due to abstinence counselling, which may increase prevalence and reduce the payoffs of all
types, whether evaluated at the old or the new utility function. Even after compensating for
the direct effect of a reduced benefit from matching, the payoff of all types may fall due to
the indirect effect of greater prevalence (riskier partners).
In addition to abstinence education which specifically targets sexually transmitted dis-
eases, governments try to control other epidemics using ‘social distancing policies’ designed
to reduce the population’s meeting rate. Examples are public announcements telling people
to stay home, closing of schools and mass transit. Exhorting people to avoid public places
aims to change preferences, similarly to abstinence education, but school and transit clo-
sures try to directly reduce contacts, thus disease transmission, analogously to prevention
and treatment. The seemingly similar social distancing policies have opposite effects, just
like abstinence and medical interventions. If those with low social activity respond more to
public messages, then disease prevalence among people still meeting each other increases,
so infections rise. By contrast, decreasing contact rates through closing schools and mass
transit reduces disease transmission.
The literature, discussed next, has mostly focussed on infection rates and medical inter-
ventions, but is increasingly considering welfare and incentives as well.
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Literature
The pathbreaking work of Kremer (1996) studied how the chosen matching probabilities
and the disease prevalence in the pool of partner-seekers respond to infection rates. The
present paper uses Kremer’s two-type model to answer the complementary questions of how
abstinence education affects prevalence, the number of partners and the payoffs of people
with different preferences for matching. The effects of abstinence programs operate via the
utility function, and contrast with the effects of prevention and treatment, which work via
infection rates.
Abstinence education modifies preferences, which changes choices. An agent who expects
altered actions of others in turn changes his best response, and this indirect influence may
strengthen or overturn the original direct effect of modifying the utility function. The current
paper derives the optimal number of partners from preferences, accounting for the feedback
from the composition of the matching pool to the choices. By contrast, Whitaker and Renton
(1992); Kremer (1994); Kremer and Morcom (1998) take the frequency of partner change as
given, thus assume the absence of the indirect effect of interacting best responses. Reducing
the number of partners for people with low activity increases the average probability of
infection in the pool of available matches. The present paper qualifies this result when
the probability of finding a partner is endogenous—a greater preference for abstinence may
counterintuitively increase the number of matches (Example 1). This interesting effect has
not been examined in the epidemiology literature, to the best of the author’s knowledge.
Heinsalu (2017, 2018) show a similar counterintuitive comparative static for informed
sellers investing to gain (earlier) access to a market of uninformed buyers—lower costs may
reduce trade and profits. Investment to enter the market is similar to the cost of finding
matches (or satiation in the number of partners) in the present work. Expected quality
in the market is analogous to the negative of the infection prevalence in the partner pool.
Reducing the production cost of the seller types resembles increasing the desire for more
matches.
In Fenichel (2013), agents’ preferences depend on their health status, which may change
endogenously from susceptible to infected and from infected to immune (no other transi-
tions are possible). Infected and immune individuals do not behave strategically, unlike
in the current work where all types optimise. Fenichel studies social distancing policies
for a benevolent planner who chooses agents’ behaviour, with or without the constraint of
identical action change for all health statuses. This constraint differs from restricting the
planner to provide to identical incentives to reduce contacts (one of the policies considered
in the current paper), because types with unequal utility functions respond differently to
the same incentives. The present paper complements Fenichel (2013) by comparing policies
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that change preferences to those cutting infection rates. For disease prevalence, reducing
infections is equivalent to decreasing the number of contacts directly, but the welfare effects
are the opposite. Involuntary behaviour change tends to decrease utility, but a lower risk of
infection improves welfare.
In Greenwood et al. (2017), in each period people search (at a cost) first in the mar-
riage market, then in markets for unprotected and protected sex. Married agents’ sex is
assumed unprotected, but monogamous, in contrast to the present paper where all agents
can search for partners and, conditional on infection, have the same transmission probability.
Greenwood et al. (2017) focus on long run steady states and assume everyone knows his or
her infection status, unlike in the current work. In numerical simulations, increasing the
utility of marriage (e.g. by abstinence education) or reducing exogenous divorces decreases
disease prevalence. By contrast, the present paper shows analytically when abstinence in-
creases prevalence and reduces welfare.
Talama`s and Vohra (2019) focus on vaccination, not abstinence, in a commonly known
social network where homogeneous agents choose who to partner with. In the current work,
heterogeneous people match randomly. In Talama`s and Vohra (2019), partially effective
vaccines may make the best stable network more connected, increasing disease transmission
and worsening welfare—the opposite of the current paper. Risk choices in their network are
strategic complements: an agent with more promiscuous partners has a lower marginal cost
of adding risky interactions, because of a greater probability of being already infected. In
the present work, contact frequencies are strategic substitutes for high-risk types, but com-
plements for low-risk. Decreasing the benefit from matching in Talama`s and Vohra (2019)
would reduce stable network connectivity and disease prevalence—the opposite outcome to
the present work.
Other theoretical articles modelling infection rates and immunisation include Galeotti and Rogers
(2013); Chen and Toxvaerd (2014); Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2017); Goyal and Vigier (2015);
Goyal et al. (2016); Toxvaerd (2019). The current paper complements this literature by con-
sidering welfare and disease prevalence under both abstinence programs and vaccination.
Empirically, Underhill et al. (2007) find that among 13 trials of abstinence programs for
a total of 15940 US youths, most had no effect, one reduced vaginal sex in the short term and
one increased the frequency of STDs in both the short and the long term. The current paper
theoretically explains how abstinence education that influences low-risk people more increases
disease prevalence. In the data, those with less sexual experience are affected more by
abstinence education. For example, Jemmott III et al. (1998) find that abstinence programs
reduce the frequency of sex more among those with a lower baseline. The reduction is
statistically significant after 3 months, but not after 6 or 12. The abstinence-only intervention
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in Jemmott et al. (2010) delayed first-time sex, but did not influence the average number
of partners, condom use or other outcomes. Bru¨ckner and Bearman (2005) find that those
making an abstinence pledge delay first-time sex, but have insignificantly higher STD rates.
In O’Donnell et al. (1999), at 6- and 12-month follow-up after safer-sex interventions, the
reduction in the probability of intercourse in the previous 3 months is proportionally larger
(but in absolute terms, smaller) for adolescents who are virgins at baseline.
Analogously to an increased preference for abstinence, bad health may lead to a lower
desire for sex. Lakdawalla et al. (2006) empirically show that advances in treatment caused
better health for HIV carriers, which increased their sexual activity and rekindled HIV
spread.
Social disapproval of (some varieties of) sex has an effect similar to a preference for
abstinence. Francis and Mialon (2010) find that tolerance for sexual minorities is negatively
associated with the HIV rate, leads low-risk gay men to enter the pool partners, and more
active men to choose less risky behaviours. Auld (1996, 2006) show that during the 1982–
1984 AIDS outbreak in San Francisco, the average number of sex partners for gay men fell by
a third, but the standard deviation and skewness increased. Thus high-activity individuals
responded less to an increase in the perceived infection probability, as in the model below.
1 Search for partners in an adversely selected pool
The model and notation follow Kremer (1996). Each person has a type k ∈ {H,L} (interpret
H as high-risk, L as low), with fraction αk being type k. Type is private information, but
the fractions are commonly known. Each type chooses the probability ik ∈ [0, 1] of matching
with a partner per unit of time.1 The fraction of type k people who are infected is denoted
Yk, with YH > YL ≥ 0. The probability that a randomly chosen partner carries the disease
is then
W :=
αH iHYH + αLiLYL
αHiH + αLiL
.(1)
Normalise the cost of infection times the probability of catching the disease from an infected
contact to 1 w.l.o.g., so the marginal cost of matching with a random partner is W for an
uninfected individual.
The payoff of type k is πk(ik) = ikθk − ψi
2
k − ikW , where ψ ≥
θH−YL
2
2 and θH > θL > 0.
The marginal benefit θk − 2ψik of matching with more partners strictly decreases in the
1By re-normalising the unit of time, choosing the probability of a match is equivalent to choosing the
number of partners per unit of time.
2The assumption ψ ≥ θH−YL
2
is sufficient for ik < 1 (interior solution) and is implicit in Kremer (1996)
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number of partners, interpreted as a satiation effect or as an increasing cost of effort of
finding matches.
Interpret changes in behaviour ik at constant infection rates Yk as occurring in the short
run. Feedback from behaviour to the fraction carrying the disease (Yk changing in response
to ik) is interpreted as taking place in the long run. For example, the susceptible-infected
(SI) models in epidemiology focus on the long run. Feedback from the chosen matching
probabilities ik to the composition W of the pool of active partner-seekers naturally occurs
in the short run (the mix of people found in a singles bar changes as soon as behaviour does),
and this is the focus from now on.
Equilibrium consists of i∗H , i
∗
L and W
∗ s.t. i∗k maximises πk(ik) given W
∗, which in turn
is derived from i∗k using (1). Based on πk(ik), the best responses to any W satisfy iH ≥ iL,
and if iL > 0, then iH > iL. Equilibria in which iL = 0 are called L-inactive and those in
which iL > 0 both-active. The next section studies the existence and properties of equilibria,
followed by the comparative statics that constitute the main result.
2 The effects of abstinence and treatment on search
and welfare
This section first establishes the existence of equilibria and their regions of uniqueness. It
then proceeds to analyse the stable equilibria, often focussing on the Pareto dominant one.
The following result (Proposition I. of Kremer (1996)) describes when different equilib-
rium combinations exist.
Proposition 1. 1) If YH < θL, then a unique equilibrium exists, with iL > 0.
2) If θL < YH < θL − θH + [θL − αLYL]/αH and [θL − αH(θH − θL) − αLYL − αHYH ]
2 −
4αH(θH − θL)(θL − YH) > 0, then there exists one L-inactive and two both-active equilibria.
3) If θL < YH > θL − θH + [θL − αLYL]/αH , then a unique equilibrium exists, with iL = 0.
Equilibria are Pareto ranked in reverse order of weighted prevalence W ∗, both for a given
set of parameters and, fixing ψ, θH , across parameters, as shown next.
Lemma 2. Fix ψ, then any equilibrium with a higher i∗k has a higher πk(i
∗
k) than an equi-
librium with a lower i∗k. Fix ψ, θH , then any equilibrium with a lower W
∗ has a higher
i∗k.
Eq. (4), which otherwise becomes ik = min
{
imax,max
{
θk−W
2ψ
, 0
}}
.
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Proof. Substitute the FOC i∗k = max
{
0, θk−W
∗
2ψ
}
into πk, which becomes ψi
∗2
k , with
dpik
di∗
k
> 0.
Changing parameters other than θk only affects i
∗
k via W
∗, and
di∗
k
dW ∗
< 0. Due to
∂i∗L
∂θL
> 0,
∂i∗
L
∂W ∗
< 0 and ∂W
∗
∂θL
< 0, an equilibrium with a lower W ∗ has a higher i∗L.
Intuitively, both types reduce activity in response to greater disease incidence, and by re-
vealed preference become worse off, because the match probability chosen at high prevalence
could be chosen at low and would yield greater utility than at high. The optimal match
probability at a low infection rate leads to an even larger payoff.
It is natural for people to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium, which by
Lemma 2 has the greatest probability of matching and the lowest prevalence of infection.
With multiple equilibria, the one with the second-highest i∗k is unstable, as shown in Lemma 4
in the Appendix. Focus on stable equilibria from now on.
The following main result examines how equilibria change in response to abstinence,
prevention or treatment. Treatment is interpreted as directly reducing infection rates Yk
among both types, possibly by different amounts. The cost of infection also falls when
treatment is available, which is equivalent to a proportional fall in both Yk. Preventative
measures decrease the probability of catching the disease given Yk, which has the same effect
as a proportional reduction in Yk. Thus the direct effects of preventions and cures may both
be modelled as decreasing YH and YL. The indirect effect of treatment is that both types
increase their probability of matching in response to a lower perceived risk of infection. As
shown next in Proposition 3, this indirect effect cannot outweigh the direct in the short
run.3 Thus preventions and cures always cut the weighted prevalence in the pool of active
partner-seekers. The welfare of all types increases as a result (Lemma 2: payoffs increase in
the matching probabilities). By contrast, changing preferences towards abstinence (reducing
θk) may increase the fraction of infected in the pool and decrease matching and the payoffs
under both the old and the new utility function.
Proposition 3. In any stable equilibrium, dW
∗
dYk
≥ 0,
di∗
k
dY
kˆ
≤ 0 for k, kˆ ∈ {H,L}, and dW
∗
dθL
≤
0 ≤ dW
∗
dθH
,
di∗
k
dθL
≥ 0,
di∗
L
dθH
≤ 0, and increasing θH less than θL reduces W
∗ and increases i∗k.
In any L-inactive equilibrium,
di∗H
dθH
≥ 0 = dW
∗
dθH
. If a decrease in θH , Yk or an increase in θL
changes the equilibrium set, then the stable equilibrium with the greatest W ∗ disappears or a
stable equilibrium with a new smallest W ∗ appears.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. The proposition shows that reducing
θL weakly more than θH (the empirically observed change) increases weighted prevalence
3In the long run, feedback from the matching probabilities ik to the fractions infected Yk may overwhelm
the initial direct effect of lower Yk and thereby increase the disease rate (Kremer, 1994).
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in the pool and reduces both types’ activity and payoffs. The direct effect of abstinence
education is a lower benefit θk1 ≤ θk0 from match-seeking, which for any prevalence W and
search intensity ik reduces the payoff, as evaluated at the new utility function πk1(ik) =
(θk1 −W )ik − ψi
2
k. The indirect effect of the changing composition of the pool of partners
strengthens the direct effect when the low types reduce their activity more, because then W
increases. At the old utility function πk0, the new optimal activity level i
∗
k1 was available but
not chosen, thus by revealed preference payoffs decrease when evaluated at the old utility
function: πk0(i
∗
k0) ≥ πk0(i
∗
k1) ≥ πk1(i
∗
k1).
Even if both types are compensated for the direct decrease in their benefit, their payoffs
may fall (Example 2 in the Appendix). Compensation means adding the benefit change
times the initial activity level (θk0 − θk1)i
∗
k0 to the payoff πk1 after the change.
4 In reality,
the compensation may be interpreted as an increased utility from alternative activities in
response to abstinence education that reduces enjoyment of casual sex. This ‘preference
substitution’ is unlikely to be large enough in practice to keep people’s payoff constant when
they do not change their activity level, so the compensation considered above should be
thought of as an upper bound.
In Proposition 3, a sufficient condition for prevalence to fall and the probabilities of
matching to increase after intensifying the preference for a greater number of partners is
that the benefit from more matches increases less for high-activity people. This condition
may be weakened, but cannot be omitted entirely, as shown next. Raising θH always increases
prevalence and may reduce both types’ matching probabilities and payoffs, as the following
example demonstrates.
Example 1. Take ψ = 0.1, αk = 0.5, YL = 0.1, YH = 0.6, θL = 0.45. If θH0 = 0.46, then
in the unique stable equilibrium, (i∗L0, i
∗
H0) ≈ (0.43, 0.48) and W
∗
0 ≈ 0.38, but if θH1 = 0.47,
then (i∗L1, i
∗
H1) ≈ (0.34, 0.44) and W
∗
1 ≈ 0.36.
Adding a small enough increase in θL to Example 1 does not overturn the qualitative
result that a greater benefit from finding a partner increases disease prevalence in the pool
of match-seekers and reduces the matching rates and payoffs. Reducing people’s benefit
θkik − ψi
2
k from an interaction directly decreases their payoff, but Example 1 shows that
the indirect effect of the changing composition of the pool of partners may overturn the
direct effect. This counterintuitive comparative static illustrates that taking preferences into
account may yield diametrically different predictions from assuming fixed behaviour (e.g.
the exogenous number of partners in Kremer (1994)).
4Reimbursing agents for the utility loss at their original choice is analogous to a Slutsky compensated
price change in consumer theory. In a single agent decision, by revealed preference, payoff cannot decrease
after Slutsky compensation. In the game in this paper, the externality of rising disease prevalence in response
to lower benefits from matching may be sufficiently strong to outweigh the compensation.
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To complete the comparative statics in Proposition 3, the following argument establishes
another interesting prediction of Kremer (1996): an increase in the matching cost ψ (faster
satiation) does not affect prevalence in any equilibrium nor change the set of equilibria. In
L-inactive equilibria, W ∗ = YH and i
∗
L are constant in ψ, and i
∗
H remains positive for all ψ.
In both-active equilibria, with linear marginal cost, positive matching probabilities i∗k fall
proportionately in ψ, which leaves W ∗ unchanged, thus has no indirect effect or feedback to
i∗k. Payoffs and matching probabilities of course decrease in ψ in any equilibrium.
Arguments in Kremer (1996) often rely on equiproportionate reductions in activity by
the types, for example in response to rising weighted prevalence in the pool. To the author’s
knowledge, the literature has not pointed out that increasing the satiation parameter ψ
causes such proportional reductions. It is worth mentioning that for both-active equilibria,
the result relies on the quadratic cost of search. However, the arguments using proportionally
decreasing matching probabilities still hold when low types reduce their activity by a greater
factor than high, which is the case for a wide class of search costs (satiation functions).
Having established the formal results, the next section proceeds to discuss extensions and
implications of the model.
3 Discussion
The results in the preceding section generalise to a wide variety of strictly convex costs of
increasing the matching probability, as may be seen in the similar framework of Heinsalu
(2018). That paper also shows that the results change qualitatively when the cost is close
to linear, because then the matching probability is always either minimal or maximal.
The qualitative results remain unchanged when two populations g ∈ {f,m} match with
each other, for example females and males. The weighted infection rate in population g is
Wg :=
αgH igHYgH+αgLigLYgL
αgH igH+αgLigL
, which is the prevalence in the pool of partners for population
gˆ 6= g. Male-to-female HIV transmission rate is higher than the female-to-male rate, which
can be captured by β > 1 in the utility function πfk(ifk) = (θfk − βWm)ifk − ψi
2
fk. The
factor β also describes different costs of infection between the populations. For example, the
human papilloma virus (HPV) harms females more, which corresponds to a greater β.
Type k in population g responds to own preferences θgk and the infection rate Wgˆ in
the other population. If both populations are subject to similar prevention, treatment or
abstinence interventions, then the effects resemble the single population case discussed above.
Embedding the short run framework of this paper in an epidemiological SI model is
straightforward and allows the infection rates of the types to respond the probability of
matching and the weighted prevalence in the pool of partners. In the long run, the additional
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feedback from infection rates to behaviour may change the comparative statics of vaccination
and treatment, as the previous literature shows. The current paper’s results from abstinence-
caused preference change are reinforced in the long run when higher weighted prevalence in
the partner pool increases infection rates for both types.
As this paper shows, abstinence programs and other preference-altering social distancing
policies may backfire during epidemics, not just in terms of disease prevalence, but also by
reducing welfare. On the other hand, medical interventions unambiguously cut infections
and improve payoffs, at least in the short run. By the principle of ‘first, do no harm’,
priority should be given to policies directly targeting disease transmission, unless compelling
countervailing reasons exist.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. In any equilibrium, by definition W ∗ ∈ [YL, YH ]. Best responses to
anyW ∗ satisfy i∗L ≤ i
∗
H , soW
∗ ≥ αHYH+αLYL. If θH ≤W
∗, then i∗k = π
∗
k = 0 andW
∗ = YH
(worst off-path belief), so the comparative statics are trivial: neither i∗k nor π
∗
k responds to
parameters, and W ∗ responds only to YH . Suppose W
∗ < θH from now on.
Substitute the BR i∗k = max
{
0, θk−W
∗
2ψ
}
into (1) to obtain
w(W ∗) =
αHYH + αLYLmax {0, θL −W
∗} /(θH −W
∗)
αH + αLmax {0, θL −W ∗} /(θH −W ∗)
.(2)
Equilibria are fixed points of w(·), because both types are best responding to the W ∗ they
expect and the resulting w(W ∗) = W ∗ justifies the expectation. If W ∗ ≥ θL, then w
′(W ∗) =
0, and if W ∗ < θL, then w
′(W ∗) > 0, because d
dW ∗
(
θL−W
∗
θH−W ∗
)
= −θH+W
∗+θL−W
∗
(θH−W ∗)2
< 0. An
equilibrium is stable iff |w′(W ∗)| < 1.
To simplify the study of the fixed points of w(·), define
δ(W ∗) : = [W ∗ − w(W ∗)][αH(θH −W
∗) + αLmax {0, θL −W
∗}]
= αH(θH −W
∗)(W ∗ − YH) + αLmax {0, θL −W
∗} (W ∗ − YL).
The zeroes of δ(W ∗) are the fixed points of w(W ∗), because θH > W
∗, so αH(θH −W
∗) > 0.
Clearly δ(YL) < 0 ≤ δ(YH). By continuity of δ, equilibrium exists. An equilibrium with
prevalence W ∗ is stable iff δ′(W ∗) > 0. Continuity of δ implies that stable and unstable
equilibria alternate.
The function δ(·) pointwise increases in θL, αL and decreases in θH , αH , Yk. Increasing
a function pointwise shifts the zeroes at which the function increases left and the zeroes at
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which the function decreases right (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). Thus in stable equilibria,
W ∗ decreases in θL, αL and increases in θH , αH , Yk (noteW
∗ differs from theW defined in (1)
and the function w in (2)). The partial derivatives
∂i∗
H
∂W ∗
< 0,
∂i∗
L
∂W ∗
≤ 0,
∂i∗
H
∂ψ
< 0,
∂i∗
L
∂ψ
≤ 0,
∂i∗
kˆ
∂Yk
= 0,
∂i∗
H
∂θL
=
∂i∗
L
∂θH
= 0,
∂i∗
k
∂θk
≥ 0 imply the total derivatives
di∗
k
dY
kˆ
≤ 0 for k, kˆ ∈ {H,L}, and
di∗
k
dθL
≥ 0,
di∗
L
dθH
≤ 0.
Define δ(W ∗, γ) := αHγ(1− ǫ)(θH −W
∗)(W ∗ − YH) + αLγmax {0, θL −W
∗} (W ∗ − YL)
for ǫ ≥ 0, γ > 0. Then dδ(W
∗,γ)
dγ
= δ(W ∗, 1)− ǫαH(θH −W
∗)(W ∗ − YH) > δ(W
∗), so at any
W ∗0 at which δ(W
∗
0 ) = 0, we have
dδ(W ∗
0
,γ)
dγ
> 0. At stable equilibria therefore dW
∗
dγ
< 0 and
di∗
k
dγ
> 0. Due to θH−W
∗ > max {0, θL −W
∗}, increasing both θk by the same amount (or θH
by less than θL) does not increase
θH−W
∗
θL−W ∗
, thus reduces W ∗ and increases i∗k. In L-inactive,
W ∗ = YH , so
di∗H
dθH
> 0.
At its smallest and largest zero, δ increases, because δ(YL) < 0 ≤ δ(YH). A pointwise
increase in a function that increases at its smallest and largest zero either leaves the set of
zeroes unchanged, removes zeroes above the smallest or adds new zeroes below the smallest
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). By Proposition 1 from Kremer (1996), δ has at most 3 zeroes.
Therefore the set of stable equilibria {W ∗ : δ′(W ∗) > 0} shifts down unambiguously when δ
increases pointwise.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium with the second-lowest W ∗ has dW
dW ∗
> 1.
Proof. If θH ≤ W
∗, then the unique equilibrium is i∗k and the lemma holds vacuously. Sup-
pose θH > W
∗ from now on. Substitute i∗k into (1) to obtainW (W
∗) = αH (θH−W
∗)YH+αL max{0,θL−W
∗}YL
αH (θH−W ∗)+αL max{0,θL−W ∗}
,
which is continuous. Due to θH > W
∗, the max in i∗H may be omitted w.l.o.g. Equilib-
ria are fixed points W (W ∗) = W ∗. Due to limW ∗→−∞W (W
∗) = αHYH + αLYL > W
∗,
the smallest fixed point W ∗min features
dW
dW ∗
|W=W ∗
min
< 1. Thus for ǫ > 0 small enough,
W (W ∗min+ ǫ) < W
∗
min+ ǫ. For the second-smallest fixed point W
∗
2 then W (W
∗
2 − ǫ) > W
∗
2 − ǫ
and dW
dW ∗
|W=W ∗
2
> 1.
Example 2. Let ψ = 0.1, αk = 0.5, YL = 0.1, YH = θL0 = 0.3, θH0 = 0.31, then the
chosen matching probabilities are i∗L0 = 0.475, i
∗
H0 = 0.525, and the payoffs are π
∗
L0 ≈ 0.023,
π∗H0 ≈ 0.028. Reducing the benefit of activity to θL1 = 0.27, θH1 = 0.3 results in i
∗
L1 = 0.225,
i∗H1 = 0.375, π
∗
L1 ≈ 0.005, π
∗
H1 ≈ 0.014, so Slutsky compensating the types by (θL0−θL1)i
∗
L0 ≈
0.014, (θH0 − θH1)i
∗
H0 ≈ 0.005 is insufficient to raise the payoffs to the initial level.
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